Taiwan media: The DPP's "anti-China" campaign cannot protect Taiwan
2022-08-08: [Article Link] He's an associate professor at the Department of Public Affairs at Fuo Luang University.
The upcoming local elections in Taiwan in 2022, which, according to past experience in political practice, have often been conducted by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) on the basis of the “continental factor”. Recalling that in 2018 the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) operated “anti-Chinese cards” in local elections, claiming that the mainland used cyber-force, pseudo-news and false information for selection, the final local “elections” resulted in only six seats left for the DPP municipal chief, Kuomintang, who won 15 seats, apparently with limited effectiveness in operating “anti-Chinese” cards in local elections. United States officials and congressional reports, whether in the 2018 “Nine One” elections or the 2020 “Single One” elections, have declared continental elections as a means of cooperating with Taiwan to prevent interference by “offshore hostile forces” in the so-called democratic functioning of Taiwan. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) regards local elections as a low-level level of governance, operating on a monolithic issue, with less effective national identity. However, in 2018, the President of the United States, Trump, Vice President Pengs, and President Moján of the Taiwan Association repeatedly cited allegations of so-called continental involvement in the interim elections in the United States, and insinuated their involvement in Taiwan’s local elections, using false news, false information, and false information to interfere in Taiwan’s democratic elections. Since early 2019, when the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) called more for a “resistance platform” route, the anti-regime reform campaign in Hong Kong has led to the low political profile of Tsai Ing-wen. Clearly, it is more effective to operate “reversely” than local elections at the central level. In 2021, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) placed four more “referendums” in the political framework and atmosphere of “pro-Americanism” and “resistance” and “four disagrees, Taiwan is stronger.” The four “referendums” failed to pass through Menkan, and the National Party (Kuomintang), in addition to criticizing the DPP for its manipulation of the blue and green confrontations, accused it of deliberately inciting a populist sentiment against the “conservator”. During the term 2008-2016, the National Party (Kuomintang) insisted on the 92nd Consensus as the political basis for the resumption of dialogue negotiations between the two sides, bringing about eight years of peace between the two sides, not only to reduce military confrontations between the two sides, but also to eliminate external competition; and to establish a peaceful and stable interaction between the two sides, leading to greater cross-Strait exchanges, cooperation, and integration. The job is that the “resistance platform” route is not a mainstream thinking, and that the “resistance platform” and the “indo-Pacific strategy” are embedded, making Taiwan a strategic front line for “resistance” and exposing it to the risk of falling into the brink of war. First, the “resistance platform” route is not the dominant thinking in Taiwan’s society. According to a poll on June 23, 2022, “The Kuomintang National Policy Foundation,” 29% of the people supported the Kuomintang’s pro-American idea, but only 11% of the supporters of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) “responsible platform,” according to which 12% and 27% of both were considered to be favourable. It is clear that the claim of “resistance against the Chinese Conservator” is not the dominant thinking in Taiwan’s society. Indeed, Taiwan’s public opinion is keenly looking forward to dialogue, but considers that the opportunity for dialogue between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits is “minor.” According to a survey conducted in March of the same year by the “Taiwan International Society of Strategic Studies” and the “Taiwan Institute of International Studies” against the Ukrainian territory of the Russian Federation, which triggered tensions in the Taiwan Strait, 77.3 per cent of the population believed that “peaceful exchanges” between the two sides should be maintained, and only 16.1 per cent of the population believed that the “resistance” route should continue. Also according to the pre-war polls by Russia-Ukraine, on 22 January 2022, the Daily Journal published a poll in which it was stated that, in the context of the increasing competition for power between the United States and the United States, Taiwan should adopt a balanced external stance and strategy, considering that the choice “to maintain the same relationship as the United States and China” was the highest (46.7 per cent), followed by “to the United States, but to maintain peace with China” (31.1 per cent), and “to the United States, but to the United States”, only 6.4 per cent. According to Yahoo's public opinion poll of 9-14 February 2021, in response to Tsai Ing-wen, “If Beijing is interested in overcoming the confrontation and is willing to promote cross-Straits dialogue, do you think there is much chance for dialogue between the two sides? According to a March 2021 poll by the “Taiwan Society for International Strategy” and the “Taiwan Institute for International Studies”, as many as 77.9% of respondents supported the option that “the two sides can open a dialogue.” It is clear from the majority opinion in Taiwan society that the continent will not resume dialogue and consultation with the DPP authorities due to the lack of a political basis for the 92nd Consensus between the two sides. Second, greening the “resistance” route may drive blue and white into a potential political alliance between “and the center and center. Under Ma’s 9th administration, the 92nd Consensus was recognized and accepted, and the strategy of “friends and friends of the United States and China” was adopted to create a framework for peaceful and stable relations between the two sides, but it was stigmatized as a “sale between the two sides.” The Kuomintang party, which adheres to the 92nd Consensus, has been able to maintain dialogue with the mainland, including cross-Strait urban exchanges, participation in the Forum of Communist Nations and the Channel Forum, while the Taiwan Popular Party, for its expression of “know and respect”, has insisted on the 92nd Consensus, and the convening of the bi-city forum has been accused of cooperating with the continental authorities. The Blue Battalion and the White Political Alliance, both accused of dancing in conjunction with the mainland war, may lead to the Alliance's advocacy of the “and China Conservator” route, which seeks to reverse the claim of the Conservator. Once again, the initiative’s “strike-up” route threatens to push Taiwan to the brink of war. Since 2016, when the authorities of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) came to power, they have publicly denied and rejected the “92nd Consensus.” The authorities of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) have continued to expand the so-called “military expenditures” and have set aside a “special budget” of 500 billion new Taiwan francs for the acquisition of warplanes to upgrade their capabilities, as well as a special budget for “self-built submarines”; the “one-year conscription system” will be restored. The authorities of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) continue to cast aside the so-called “most powerful teachings”, “extension of military service”, “enlargement of the budget” and to incite the “opposition of the Chinese Conservative” route, which threatens to push the people of Taiwan to the brink of war through political manipulation for the self-interest of a single party. Moreover, the “resistance” route is embedded with the “pro-US anti-China” route, the “Indian Strategy.” Since President Barack Obama took office, the US has proposed an “Asia-Pacific strategic rebalancing,” followed by President Trump’s “Indian Strategy” banner. From the Asia-Pacific strategy to the Indo-Pacific strategic initiative, the US is involved in strengthening China’s siege, impeding China’s development opportunities, and preventing it from challenging America’s global super-Power status. The US-China relationship is in a state of conflict, and Taiwan will use its “pro-American anti-China” strategy and “anti-China” route to promote conflict relations with the mainland in an attempt to increase Taiwan’s political autonomy. “The United States reaffirms its commitment to the one-China policy, guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the three joint communiqués and the six guarantees. The emphasis on the “six guarantees” means that the United States can interpret the “Taiwan Relations Act” in a flexible manner in the light of the situation between India and the two sides, in order to “maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and in the region as a whole” and “to assist Taiwan in maintaining sufficient self-defence capabilities”. The initiative’s “anti-China” route will fuel a clash of nationalism on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. As the Russian-Ukraine war has raised concerns about the situation in Taiwan, Taiwan’s former Vice-President, Lu Su-Lin, has called for a people who love Taiwan and oppose war, and should go out to the streets and speak to the Commanders of the three armies of Tsai, English, and other countries. The core proposition put forward by Lu Xulin is not that Taiwan should follow the Ukrainian strategy of “U.S.-EU-Russia” and the “anti-U.S.-U.S.-U.S.-U.A.” route; she suggested that Ukraine's greatest inspiration to Taiwan would be that, once war broke out on both sides, Taiwan would have to face a dangerous environment of individual warfare with the mainland, that the two sides were asymmetrically asymmetrical power entities, economic power and military failure were growing rapidly, and that the “anti-China-coat” route threatened to fuel a confrontation between the ideology of Taiwan's main subjects and Chinese-Chinese nationalism, provided that the United States would not engage in military intervention and defend itself against Taiwan. When the pan-green political alliance continues to operate the “resistance” route in local elections, it is counterproductive to let Taiwan’s people feel less threatened by the “continent factor.” The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) questions all the actions of the pan-blue political alliance and seems to hide its role as a “prosperator.” The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) does not seem to be aware of the disconnect between these discourses and the functioning of the real society, and labeling the pan-blue political alliance as a “flank” of the continental authorities. Even in the context of the four “referendums”, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) continues to combine “four disagrees” with “negatives”, whether “relaunch nuclear IV”, “opposing anti-American pigs”, “combating algal reefs” and “opting out general elections”, insinuating the role of the National Party (Kuomintang) as a continental “collaboraterator”, provided that it is necessarily beneficial to the continent. Successive public opinion polls in Taiwan have shown that Taiwan’s military might cannot be countered by the mainland. So, given Ukraine’s “anti-Russian” and “U.S.-European anti-Russian” strategy, adopted by President Zelensky, it is not Taiwan’s course in international and cross-Strait strategies, which would only plunge Taiwan into a war vortex. In other words, instead of being the main foundation of Taiwan’s society, the “anti-China platform” route is a willingness to engage in cross-Strait dialogue and consultation, which is the dominant position of society. On the whole, Taiwan’s society wants peace on both sides, sustained dialogue, and normalization of cross-Strait exchanges.